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INTRODUCTION  
Accounts of the American military buildup that began in 1950 nearly always focus on a 
policy statement entitled "United States Objectives and Programs for National Security," 
better known by its file number: NSC 68. The report, which a joint State and Defense 
Department working group submitted to the president on 7 April 1950, held that the 
Soviet Union was engaged in an all-out effort to extend its influence and control over all 
regions of the world. Furthermore, it asserted that the means available to the Kremlin 
were considerable and growing constantly. Arguing that "[t]hese risks crowd in on us, in 
a shrinking world of polarized power, so as to give us no choice, ultimately, between 
meeting them effectively and being overcome by them," NSC 68 concluded that "it is 
clear that a substantial and rapid military building up of strength in the free world is 
necessary to support a firm policy necessary to check and roll back the Kremlin's drive 
for world domination."2  
The rearmament program NSC 68 initiated marked a turning point in US foreign policy, 
militarizing what had been primarily an economic and diplomatic effort to contain the 
Soviet Union.3 While the report's rhetoric about the Soviet threat was nothing new, and 
subsequent policy statements  including later versions of NSC 68 itself  were also 
associated with large increases in defense spending, NSC 68 is significant because it put 
an end to the Truman administration's efforts to restrain military spending. Indeed, in real 
terms, US military spending has never returned to the levels prevailing before 1950. The 
reasons for this shift in policy have been a source of continuing interest to historians of 
US foreign relations.  
CONTENDING EXPLANATORY APPROACHES TO POLICY CHANGE  
In addition to its importance in the history of US foreign policy, the development of NSC 
68 presents an opportunity to compare two contrasting analytical approaches to the 
policy-making process. The first approach, associated with the realist school of 
international relations theory, and with historiography stressing the importance of 
consensual "core values" or a "national security imperative," interprets policy-making as 
the response of the state, understood as a unitary actor, to events and conditions in the 
international system.4 The second approach, associated with the emerging international 
relations literature on the importance of domestic politics and with some revisionist 
interpretations of US foreign policy, focuses on conflicting understandings of these 
international events and conditions, and treats policy outcomes as the result of political 
conflict among domestic advocates of these different interpretations. These two 
approaches imply very different accounts of the development of NSC 68.  
The role of domestic politics in explaining foreign policy outcomes is usually discussed 
in terms of the relative importance of domestic and international factors, a formulation 
that obscures the real stakes in the debate. Everyone agrees that decision makers respond 
to international events. The fundamental question is whether the policy implications of 
these events can be understood without knowing who is interpreting them. Do "national 
security imperatives" have the same meaning to everyone, or would a different set of 
policy makers view them another way? Does everyone interpret international events in 
terms of the same set of "core values?"  
If international events and conditions hold the same meaning for everyone, then policy-
making can be treated as a learning process in which policy makers work to discern the 
imperatives of the international system. Apart from the fact that some individuals are 
wiser or learn more quickly than others, the identity of those making the decisions is not 
very important. This theoretical perspective implies a historical account that focuses on 
state responses to international events, rather than on conflict among decision makers 
over the policy implications of international conditions. Sophisticated versions of this 
theoretical framework, such as the one advanced by Melvyn Leffler, acknowledge that 
the "core values" decision makers use to interpret events are rooted in historical conflicts 
within the state and society.5However, these conflicts precede the decision-making 
process and play no direct role in it.  
If one presumes that a different group of policy makers might interpret the same events 
and conditions differently, then the process is better understood as a political struggle 
between advocates of different interpretations seeking control of state policy. Rather than 
relegating conflicts about appropriate policy goals and priorities to a period before 
agreement on the present core values, historical accounts adopting this perspective place 
these conflicts at the center of the policy-making process. Policy change might result 
from a change in the group interpreting international conditions rather than from a change 
in the international conditions themselves. Indeed, without knowing the priorities of the 
group controlling the policy-making process, it is difficult to know what response any 
event will evoke.  
Both these understandings of the policy-making process are alive and well in 
international relations theory and the historiography of the Cold War. Although it has 
many detractors, realist international relations theory treating the state as a unitary actor 
is still the dominant approach to understanding the development of policy on security 
issues.6 The unitary actor assumption has considerable analytical advantages, particularly 
in the examination of strategic interaction between states, and is implied by many 
common explanatory concepts, such as the notion of "national interest." Many historians 
of US foreign policy during the early Cold War era also make an implicit unitary actor 
assumption, stressing the importance of security concerns and arguing that international 
events and conditions demanded that policy makers respond in particular ways. These 
accounts generally stress the inability of those opposed to these policy responses to put 
forward a coherent alternative.7  
A growing body of international relations theory disputes the realist argument that the 
nature of the domestic political regime does not change the influence of international 
events.8 Even an apparently homogenous group of decision makers of the same class, 
gender, and ethnicity often have different goals and priorities. They may view the same 
international events and conditions very differently. What appears as an overwhelming 
threat to one group may be less important than other considerations for another. Within a 
less uniform group, wider differences are likely. During the early Cold War era, 
Democrats and Republicans disagreed in important ways about the appropriate level of 
military spending and foreign aid. Even within the Truman administration, officials 
disagreed about the relative importance of balancing the budget and committing greater 
resources to achieve foreign policy goals. When there is disagreement about goals and 
priorities, it is inappropriate to treat policy as if it reflected a consensual set of core 
values. Recognizing the importance of conflict over policy, some historians have raised 
the possibility that different sets of decision makers might have perceived international 
events differently and chosen other policies.9  
These two approaches to the policy-making process lead to different expectations about 
cases of major policy change such as the development of NSC 68. The range of processes 
compatible with a unitary actor assumption, or a presumed set of consensual core values, 
is rather narrow. Since it holds that alternative policies do not emerge from domestic 
politics, historical accounts rooted in this perspective associate external events with 
policy change, arguing that they drive policy makers toward recognition of the 
imperatives of the international system. Most historical accounts of NSC 68 use external 
events as explanatory devices.10 The alternative approach stressing domestic political 
conflict, on the other hand, links policy choice to the struggle for control of the policy-
making apparatus among groups with contending interpretations of the international 
environment. The case of NSC 68 affords an opportunity to evaluate which of these two 
approaches explains the process of policy change best. Although policy-making during 
the early Cold War era is considered a strong case for those stressing realist geopolitical 
imperatives or core values, the evidence I will present here indicates that the domestic 
political conflict approach accounts for more of the evidence about the policy-making 
process.  
THE IMPORTANCE OF "PROCESS"  
Unitary actor models of state behavior are not usually intended to explain the policy-
making process. Nevertheless, although some analysts appeal to the argument that a 
causal process may proceed "as if" a necessary assumption were true, most of those who 
acknowledge making a unitary actor assumption also argue that it is reasonably realistic. 
For example, Bruce Bueno de Mesquita contends that the most useful and realistic way to 
justify this assumption is to argue that the decision-making process is dominated by a 
single strong leader. George Downs and David Rocke offer a formal proof that, under 
some conditions, decisions subject to the influence of advisers may be consistent with the 
utility function of a unitary, rational actor.11 These arguments are important. Even when a 
theory makes correct predictions about outcomes, it must offer some account of the 
causal process involved. Without a sense of process, it is difficult to be sure empirical 
associations are not spurious, even if they are statistically significant.12 The lack of a 
compelling sense of process can prevent even an empirically supported theory from 
gaining acceptance. Difficulty in specifying the causal process involved is one of the 
reasons many scholars doubt the argument that democracies do not go to war against each 
other in spite of the evidence offered to support it.  
Since process is theoretically important, it makes sense to examine it directly. Theories 
imply empirically testable propositions about how outcomes are generated, although 
more than one process may fit a theory. These empirical statements can be examined 
using what Alexander George and Timothy McKeown call "process tracing." This 
method uses evidence about various features of the decision-making environment, 
including both the actors' definitions of their situation and the institutional arrangements 
affecting their attention, information-processing and behavior. George and McKeown 
argue that a good account of the decision-making process must explain a "stream of 
behavior through time .... Any explanation of the processes at work thus not only must 
explain the final outcome, but must also account for this stream of behavior."13  
George and McKeown note that process-tracing must not only recreate actors' 
"definitions of the situation," but also contain a "theory of action."14 Such a theory is 
necessary to fit isolated pieces of historical evidence into a coherent pattern, and to fill 
the gaps in this evidence in a logical way. Bounded rationality, misperception, lags, or 
other special assumptions may be part of this theory of action, but the conditions under 
which they apply must be clearly articulated and applied consistently throughout the 
analysis. One could easily account for everything in a stream of behavior using ad hoc 
assertions about misperception, mistakes or lags. While such accounts may be artful, they 
do not shed any light on the usefulness of the underlying theoretical propositions.  
THE DEVELOPMENT OF NSC 68  
At first glance, it is tempting to attribute the development of the rearmament program 
associated with NSC 68 to the broad pattern of tension between the United States and the 
Soviet Union after World War II. However, because this atmosphere of conflict was a 
fairly constant feature of the international environment between 1945 and 1950, it does 
not explain the timing of the rearmament program. While this pattern of conflict no doubt 
explains why some decision makers supported rearmament well before NSC 68 put their 
sentiments in writing, it cannot account for previous presidential decisions to cut the 
military budget. A satisfying explanation for NSC 68 must focus on considerations 
specifically linked to this particular policy initiative rather than on the general conflict 
between the United States and the Soviet Union.  
Shorn of the considerable historical detail they offer, the account of the development of 
NSC 68 offered by most historians who use a realist approach, such as Samuel Wells, or 
stress consensual core values, such as Melvyn Leffler, is simple. As Wells puts it, several 
events in the fall of 1949 "struck the United States like a series of hammer blows." 
Concern about these events, especially the Soviet acquisition of the atomic bomb and the 
collapse of the Nationalist regime in China, led directly to the writing of NSC 68.15 
Nevertheless, President Truman's desire to avoid large budget deficits made him reluctant 
to approve such a costly new policy, and the report languished in bureaucratic obscurity 
until the Korean War.16  
While plausible, this realist interpretation of the development of NSC 68 within the 
administration does not withstand close scrutiny. I will first review the evidence Wells 
and Leffler offer to support their argument about the impact of the "hammer blows" of 
1949. In fact, these events were substantially discounted when they happened and were 
immediately followed by a reduction in the military budget. Next, I will examine the 
argument that the administration would not have proposed a rearmament program 
without the Korean War. Here, the bulk of the evidence indicates that President Truman 
decided to propose some rearmament program to Congress soon after he received NSC 
68. Finally, I will review evidence supporting the argument that political changes within 
the administration, rather than a unifying effect produced by external shocks, led to 
presidential approval of NSC 68.  
Why Was NSC 68 Written?  
The most serious problem with the argument that the events of 1949 created a sense of 
crisis within the administration is that they were followed by a decision to cut the military 
budget. This reduction was originally proposed by Frank Pace, the Director of the Bureau 
of the Budget, and presented to the cabinet by the president on 1 July 1949.17 Afterwards, 
the NSC undertook a study of the effects of these cuts. This study and the responses to it, 
which became the NSC 52 series, were discussed by the Council and approved by the 
president on 30 September 1949, just one week after Truman publicly announced the 
detection of the Soviet atomic test.18 Although the State Department objected to cuts in 
the newly approved Military Defense Assistance Program, the budget the president sent 
to Congress in January 1950 contained nearly all the reductions Pace had originally 
recommended, including a smaller military budget. Truman's refusal to increase the 
military budget in 1949 suggests that he shared the concern of many of his advisers about 
the effects of a large budget deficit.  
Evidence of policy makers' reactions to the 1949 events indicates that they caused no 
great alarm. The fall of the Nationalist regime in China had been anticipated long before 
the proclamation of the People's Republic in October 1949. Virtually every intelligence 
report and policy discussion concerning China after the Marshall mission in 1947 either 
predicted or assumed the collapse of the Nationalist regime. For example, a CIA Special 
Evaluation dated 21 July 1948, commented that "[t]he Chinese National Government is 
now so unstable that its collapse or overthrow could occur at any time."19 The Secretary 
of State acknowledged this consensus at a February 1949 NSC meeting. "[Acheson] said 
there was general agreement that, from a strategic point of view, China was an area of 
lower priority, especially since the house appeared to be falling down and there was not 
much to be done until it had come down."20 The State Department's China White Paper, 
released in July, publicly acknowledged that the civil war in China was effectively over, 
and the United States had to "face the situation as it exists in fact."21 If the fall of China 
helped motivate NSC 68, then the attitude of the State Department, the organization most 
active in developing the policy, is very difficult to explain.  
Similarly, the Soviet acquisition of atomic weapons occurred before the September 30 
NSC meeting and was substantially discounted at the time. The Soviet atomic test may 
have strengthened the convictions of Paul Nitze and others in favor of more spending, but 
they already held these opinions before this discovery was made. It did not change the 
outcome of the debate over the military budget reductions, and there is no evidence that it 
converted any of the advocates of these cuts. George Kennan argued in February 1950, 
when the writing of NSC 68 was already underway, that "[t]he demonstration of an 
'atomic capability' on the part of the U.S.S.R. likewise adds no new fundamental element 
to the picture . . .. The fact that this situation became a reality a year or two before it was 
expected is of no fundamental significance."22 Leffler, whose account of NSC 68 does 
not rely on this event, notes that public reaction to the event also quickly subsided and 
was not a major consideration in subsequent decisions about American weapons 
development.23 An October 1949 edition of the State Department's secret "Weekly 
Review" of world events stated that there was no evidence the new weapon would change 
Soviet foreign policy and commented that the US still retained the upper hand. In 
Truman's copy of this document, the passage making this point is underlined in red.24  
The major proponents of NSC 68 were already convinced of the need for greater military 
spending before the "hammer blows" of 1949. While these events may have strengthened 
their convictions about the need for a greater resource commitment to the national 
security program, their opinions on this issue developed from broader concerns about the 
economic situation in Europe and the viability of the NATO military force. Paul Nitze 
has noted that his concern about military spending began in the spring of 1949, when he 
participated in joint military planning efforts with European officials. They estimated the 
cost of a defense capable of stopping a Soviet attack at the Rhine to be $45 billion. Nitze 
worried that Congress would only appropriate $1 billion for military aid.25 Furthermore, 
Leon Keyserling, who would provide the fiscal policy rationale for the rearmament 
program, told the president in August 1949 that "our economy can sustain  in fact, must 
be subjected to policies that make it able to sustain  such military outlays as are vital to 
[our national] objectives."26 The advocates of greater military spending did not need the 
Soviet atomic bomb or the fall of China to convince them of its strategic importance or 
economic viability.  
In spite of the concerns of Nitze and others at the State Department, those seeking to 
reduce military spending prevailed in the fall of 1949. Most did not deny the existence of 
serious international threats, but instead argued that other priorities were just as 
important. At the September 30 NSC meeting, the fiscally conservative Chairman of the 
Council of Economic Advisers (CEA), Edwin Nourse, summed up their reasoning, 
stating that large deficits at a time of high business activity were "no less a risk than our 
diplomatic or military risks."27 While strenuous protests from the State Department 
eventually restored some of the foreign aid cuts, Secretary of Defense Louis Johnson 
blocked any effort by the military services to avoid cuts in their budget. Even the Soviet 
acquisition of the atomic bomb and the communist victory in China did not prevent these 
cuts.  
When Was NSC 68 Really Approved?  
Like the assertion that events during the fall of 1949 drove the writing of NSC 68, the 
argument that the administration would not have proposed a rearmament program 
without the Korean War is difficult to sustain. Although the president did not formally 
approve the report until 30 September, there is substantial evidence that he had decided to 
propose a rearmament program to Congress in the spring of 1950, before the North 
Korean attack on South Korea. It is clear that his closest advisers believed Harry Truman 
supported a rearmament program soon after it arrived on his desk on 7 April and planned 
to present it to Congress as soon as a legislative proposal was ready.  
The little direct evidence of Truman's position on NSC 68 implies that he had informally 
approved the report. On 23 May, Truman reportedly encouraged Bureau of the Budget 
officials to raise any questions they had about NSC 68 programs, remarking that "it was 
definitely not as large as some of the people seemed to think." As Steven Rearden notes, 
these comments indicate both presidential uncertainty about the size of the program and 
an informal decision to proceed with rearmament.28 Truman's uncertainty about the size 
of the new budget was understandable, both because program details and budget 
estimates from the Department of Defense were not yet complete, and because he had to 
consider what Congress could be induced to accept. His instructions that the Bureau of 
the Budget should remain skeptical of these programs are similarly unremarkable, since 
this was the Bureau's role in all cases. The central point of debate, however, was whether 
the spending reductions contained in the fiscal 1951 budget then before the Congress 
would continue. The president's assumption that the military budget would increase 
indicates that he no longer supported further budget cuts.  
Most of the evidence about the president's attitude toward the rearmament program 
comes from the statements and actions of his advisers. Acheson comments in his 
memoirs that NSC 68 "became national policy" after it was discussed by the NSC in 
April.29 He was not alone in thinking Truman endorsed plans for rearmament. White 
House Special Counsel Charles Murphy was preparing a major presidential address based 
on NSC 68 as soon as the preliminary cost estimates were ready. Murphy could not have 
made such ambitious plans without the president's authorization. In April, Truman had 
requested that these estimates be prepared as quickly as possible. The timetable for their 
submission was subsequently accelerated so that they could be available for an 
anticipated presidential address in early June.30 Although the complicated task of 
planning a new military budget could not be completed until September, the White 
House's efforts to accelerate the process are a strong indication of presidential support for 
rearmament.  
Truman's decision to appoint Averell Harriman as a Special Assistant to the President 
offers additional evidence of the president's plans. At the suggestion of the State 
Department, Sidney Souers, the former Executive Secretary of the NSC, suggested to the 
president on 8 June that he appoint Harriman to oversee matters relating to NATO and 
the dollar gap problem, "and to interest himself in coordinating the implementation of 
various phases of NSC 68." According to Souers, Truman "indicated great interest in the 
program and thought it would be a fine solution."31 With the president's approval, 
Harriman assumed his new post on 16 June. Truman's endorsement of plans for the 
"implementation" of NSC 68 is a clear indication that he supported the policy it 
represented.  
Harriman and the others charged with securing Congressional approval for NSC 68 
programs faced a difficult task. Prevailing Congressional sentiment favored additional 
cuts in the military budget, and Arthur Vandenberg, who had been the most important 
coordinator of Republican support for the administration's foreign policy in the Senate, 
was confined to his Michigan home by cancer. While the administration kept its plans for 
the defense budget secret at Truman's insistence, both the White House and the State 
Department sought to find some way to secure Congressional approval for rearmament. It 
is obviously impossible to know if the administration could have pushed the rearmament 
program through Congress without the political boost provided by intervention in Korea. 
It is clear, however, that they planned to try. While the obstacles to success were 
daunting, administration officials had overcome formidable opposition to previous 
foreign policy initiatives. Plans for another such effort provide additional evidence that 
Truman had accepted the program before 25 June and raise questions about the assertion 
that rearmament would never have happened without the war in Korea.32  
The first moves toward building Congressional support for rearmament were suggested 
by the State Department, which had already shown NSC 68 to a few influential 
individuals outside the government.33 Under Secretary of State James Webb interrupted 
the president's vacation in Key West on 26 March to show him NSC 68 and ask him to 
bring John Foster Dulles into the administration in an effort to mend the tattered fabric of 
bipartisanship. Since his departure from the Senate, Dulles had written to Acheson 
expressing his support for administration policy even when it was opposed by other 
Republicans, hinting that he could be useful in the State Department. Although the 
president initially hesitated to make such an appointment, he finally agreed on 4 April 
and Dulles joined the administration as a consultant to the State Department on 26 
April.34  
In addition to using Dulles as a bridge between the administration and Congressional 
Republicans, the White House and State Department tried to restore bipartisanship on 
foreign policy in other ways. Soon after Truman returned from Key West, Acheson 
attempted to set up a formal consultation arrangement with the Senate Republican 
leadership. On 18 April, Truman and Acheson announced an agreement with Styles 
Bridges, the ranking Republican on the Armed Services and Appropriations Committees, 
to consult with a committee of five Republican Senators. This group was to include 
Bridges, Robert Taft (Chair of the Republican Policy Committee), Eugene Millikin 
(Chair of the Republican Party Conference), Kenneth Wherry (Senate minority leader) 
and Alexander Wiley (the ranking Republican on the Foreign Relations Committee).35 
Although he could not participate, Vandenberg encouraged the arrangement, informing 
Acheson that Bridges was "coming around" to the internationalist position, despite his 
anti-administration rhetoric.36 The State Department also initiated a series of informal 
"smokers" with influential members of Congress, especially Republicans. Robert Taft, 
for one, received an invitation to a gathering scheduled for 10 May.37  
Bipartisan cooperation could not be achieved through mere meeting and consultation, 
however. Many Republicans greeted news of the Dulles appointment with skepticism. 
Robert Taft prepared a statement for the smoker to which he had been invited noting that 
"[n]o policy can become bi-partisan by the appointment of Republicans to executive 
office, although we hope that recent appointments are intended as a move toward the 
establishment of closer relations with the elected Republicans in Congress."38 The 
consultation arrangement set up through Styles Bridges also collapsed when the 
Democratic chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, Tom Connally, 
objected to any arrangement that bypassed the members of his committee. Unwilling to 
offend Connally, Truman and Acheson scuttled the plan.39 To make matters worse for the 
State Department, many conservative Republicans simply refused to attend the smokers. 
In the midst of their effort to depict the State Department as an organization riddled with 
communist sympathizers, they were apparently reluctant to socialize publicly with State 
Department officials.40  
It would have been naive to expect Congressional support without any political cost, and 
the president was prepared to pay a price for rearmament. Probably recognizing that they 
were unlikely to obtain both rearmament and progress on their social welfare agenda, the 
Fair Deal, Truman and his staff removed some major Fair Deal programs from their 
legislative agenda at the end of May. A comparison of White House staff member 
Stephen Spingarn's list of "top musts" from the president's legislative program, made at a 
White House staff meeting in November 1949, with his list of "urgent legislation" made 
at a similar meeting in May 1950, reveals the deletion of several such proposals. In 
particular, the repeal of the Taft-Hartley Act, the National Health Insurance Program, and 
the administration's farm subsidy proposals had been removed from the list of legislative 
priorities, despite the lack of positive action on them.41 These popular programs had 
played an important part in Truman's 1948 re-election campaign. Their accidental 
omission is highly unlikely. Indeed, the November and the May meetings on the 
legislative program both worked from the same printed list of legislative proposals. 
Changed priorities in light of NSC 68 offer a better explanation. The report had 
concluded that rearmament would require "[r]eduction in Federal expenditures for 
purposes other than defense and foreign assistance, if necessary by the deferment of 
certain desirable programs."42  
To summarize, Truman's closest foreign policy advisers believed that he had effectively 
approved NSC 68 soon after receiving it, and needed only the final program and budget 
information before formally signing the report. Dean Acheson maintained that it was 
"national policy" in April. Charles Murphy, one of the most important members of the 
president's staff, joined the Ad Hoc Committee on NSC 68 and made plans for a 
presidential address on the subject as soon as the details of the program were complete. 
Sidney Souers was sure enough of the president's position on the matter to approach him 
about a plan for "implementation" of the program. The president endorsed several plans 
to gain Congressional support for a new foreign policy initiative in the period 
immediately preceding the Korean War. If Truman did not support rearmament, it is 
difficult to understand his actions and those of many of his closest advisers.  
Why Did Truman Accept NSC 68?  
It is very difficult to understand the development of the rearmament program in the 
administration in terms of a unitary actor model. Broad consideration of conditions in the 
international environment do not account for the timing of the program. Why cut the 
military budget in 1949, then move to increase it less than a year later? Particular 
international events also provide a weak basis for explaining the policy-making process. 
The events most often cited as prompting the development of NSC 68  especially the 
collapse of the Nationalist regime in China, the Soviet acquisition of the atomic bomb, 
and the beginning of the Korean War  do not correspond chronologically to the policy 
developments they are supposed to explain.  
A consideration of the changing political circumstances within the administration 
between the fall of 1949 and the spring of 1950 suggests a better explanation. In the fall 
of 1949, the small budget faction held many key administration posts. Some, like Louis 
Johnson, had also played important roles in the president's 1948 re-election campaign. In 
the spring of 1950, the advocates of NSC 68 successfully changed the political 
composition of the administration, marginalizing those who had favored budget cuts in 
the fall and mobilizing politically important supporters of rearmament. The personnel 
shifts associated with this political change are summarized in Table 1. Although not all of 
these changes resulted directly from efforts by the advocates of NSC 68, they all 
contributed to a major shift in the internal composition of the Truman administration. 
Harry Truman heard very different voices in the spring of 1950 than he had in the fall of 
1949.  
The first important change came in November of 1949, when Edwin Nourse resigned as 
Chairman of the CEA, leaving Leon Keyserling as the acting chair. Keyserling had 
argued in favor of greater military spending during the debate over the fiscal 1951 
defense budget in 1949. His conflict with Nourse over this issue led to Nourse's decision 
to resign.43 Keyserling's new status strengthened the coalition supporting NSC 68 within 
the executive branch. Truman's decision to make Keyserling's appointment permanent in 
May, after six months of hesitation, is yet another signal that the president had accepted 
NSC 68's call for greater spending.  
Wells incorrectly treats the CEA as an opponent of NSC 68. In fact, Leon Keyserling 
helped promote the program, consistently maintaining that the US economy had the 
capacity to sustain larger expenditures on defense. Charles Murphy remarked that, in 
meetings of the Ad Hoc Committee on NSC 68,  
[t]he question came up repeatedly, in one form or another, 'How much can we afford to 
spend?' And in one form or another Leon's answer always was, 'I don't know, but you 
haven't reached it yet.' He always said, 'You can afford to spend more on defense if you 
need to.'44  
Table 1  
Positions of Major Presidential Advisers on NSC 68  
"Small Budget" Faction  
Actor Position in September 1949 Changes in Position by April 1950
Louis Johnson Secretary of Defense 
Still Secretary of Defense, but 
position greatly weakened. 
Fired in September 1950. 
George Kennan Director, Policy Planning Staff,State Department 
Counsellor, State Department. 
Sent on tour of South America while
NSC 68 sent to White House. 
Edwin Nourse Chairman, Council of EconomicAdvisers 
Resigned from Council of Economic
Advisers, November 1949. 
Frank Pace Director, Bureau of the Budget 
Removed as Director of the Bureau 
of the Budget, made Secretary 
of the Army, April 1950. 
"Large Budget" Faction  
Actor Position in September 1949 Changes in Position by April 1950
Dean Acheson Secretary of State None. 
Averell 
Harriman 
Ambassador at Large, principally
concerned with implementation 
of 
the Marshall Plan. 
Although still Ambassador at Large, 
Harriman is privy to NSC 68 and 
is brought to White House in June 
to oversee its "implementation." 
Leon Keyserling Member, Council of Economic Advisers 
Acting Chairman, Council of 
Economic Advisers. Named 
permanent Chairman, May 1950. 
Charles Murphy 
White House Special Counsel, 
but plays no role in September 
1949 deliberations. 
Joins Ad Hoc Committee on NSC 
68, 
preparing presidential address 
on rearmament. 
Paul Nitze Member, Policy Planning Staff, State Department 
Director, Policy Planning Staff, 
State Department 
Sidney Souers Executive Secretary, National Although he resigns as Executive 
Security Council Secretary in January 1950, he  
remains a Consultant and 
participates 
in writing of NSC 68. 
James Webb Under Secretary of State None. 
While the CEA's memo on NSC 68 expressed concern about the political viability of 
rearmament, it did not question the basic goals of NSC 68 or the principle of greater 
military spending. "Unless carefully and imaginatively prepared, their adoption could 
create concerns on the part of the Congress and the public which could ultimately 
threaten their success."45 The strongest advocates of NSC 68 were well aware of these 
problems and would certainly have agreed with this statement.  
Acheson and others favoring greater spending took other steps to weaken their opponents 
in the executive branch. Acheson replaced George Kennan with Paul Nitze as head of the 
State Department's Policy Planning Staff in January 1950. During their 1949 discussions 
of the issue, Kennan and Nitze had disagreed over the amount of military spending 
required to contain the Soviet Union. Nitze had long favored a much larger program of 
aid and military spending. Kennan had argued that two or three Marine divisions would 
be enough to carry out the military aspects of containment, which he envisioned primarily 
as a political and diplomatic strategy rather than a military one.46 Acheson supported 
Nitze's position. Kennan may have been coming around to this point of view, but 
Acheson was not inclined to wait.47  
Since none of its drafters had any reason to expect his support, Louis Johnson had not 
been kept fully informed on the developing new policy.48 The completed report was 
presented to him at a 22 March meeting with the working group that had written it. 
Predictably, Johnson was furious. He angrily accused the assembled group and Secretary 
of State Acheson of attempting to undermine his authority in a violent outburst that ended 
the meeting in less than fifteen minutes. When the incident was reported to Truman, he 
reportedly considered firing Johnson immediately.49 As Acheson had known before 
scheduling the ill-fated meeting, Johnson was about to leave for a NATO Defense 
Ministers' Conference in The Hague. In his absence, the report was distributed in the 
Department of Defense. Within a few days of Johnson's return, the report was on his desk 
with the approval of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and all three service Secretaries. Faced with 
a fait accompli, and having already embarrassed himself over the issue, Johnson signed 
the report and it was formally sent to the White House on 7 April 1950.  
According to Paul Hammond's interview-based account, after Johnson met with the 
president when the National Security Council discussed NSC 68 in April, he told Defense 
Department officials privately "that his economy program was dead and that he had 
shaken hands with the President on it."50 Reflecting this change in the administration's 
plans, Johnson's 26 April testimony to Congress on the fiscal 1951 budget was extremely 
ambiguous on future plans for the defense budget, even implying that a buildup was 
possible.51  
The State Department also successfully sought to have Frank Pace, the fiscally 
conservative Director of the Bureau of the Budget, replaced at the end of March, an event 
not mentioned in any of the accounts of NSC 68 cited here. Pace had been an outspoken 
advocate of reducing military spending, and had initiated the successful effort to reduce 
the fiscal 1951 defense budget from $15 billion to $13 billion in the summer of 1949. 
Circumstantial evidence suggests that Pace's removal was linked to NSC 68. According 
to interviews conducted by Hammond, Pace refused to change his opinion on military 
spending after reading NSC 68. "Reportedly, he quoted to Nitze Bureau of the Budget 
figures on how much the economy could stand in the way of Federal expenditures, and 
how necessary expenditures on other things besides foreign and military affairs were."52 
Under Secretary of State James Webb asked the president to remove Pace from the 
Bureau of the Budget at the same 26 March meeting where he presented Truman with a 
copy of NSC 68, suggesting that he would be a good Secretary of the Army.53 The 
president agreed.  
Pace's successor, Frederick Lawton, kept his distance from the debate over NSC 68, 
confining his attention to the administrative aspects of the policies set forth by the 
president and the rest of the administration. He did not attend the meetings of the Ad Hoc 
Committee on NSC 68. Instead, he assigned William Schaub, Deputy Chief of the 
Division of Estimates, to represent the Bureau of the Budget. Although Schaub objected 
vigorously to the enormous expenditures implied in the document, his comments appear 
to have had no effect on the committee, composed mostly of individuals with more 
standing in the policy-making arena.54 After Pace's removal, the Bureau of the Budget 
was a much less formidable barrier to rearmament.  
While weakening the opponents of greater military spending, the supporters of NSC 68 
sought to mobilize politically important individuals likely to support it. Harriman, who 
would later be brought to the White House to help implement the program, returned from 
Europe to express his support for the report at the 20 April NSC meeting.55 Other key 
internationalists were asked to review the report in March.56 Although all of them had 
suggestions and comments concerning the report, few changes were made in the final 
version sent to the president and the National Security Council. The purpose of the 
consultation process was the cultivation of sympathetic individuals who were in a 
position to influence public and elite opinion, not to rewrite the report. Several of the 
consultants recognized this purpose and called for further efforts to convince the public 
of the need for rearmament. Chester Barnard, President of the Rockefeller Foundation, 
suggested several people who could be included in a group to promote the program. 
Noting the need for "a much vaster propaganda machine to tell our story at home and 
abroad," Robert Lovett suggested a public relations campaign to enlist the aid of 
"schools, colleges, churches, and other groups." He also mentioned a list of "elder 
statesmen" similar to the one suggested by Barnard.57  
While the president remained on vacation in Key West, Nitze and others sought to 
convince important but previously uninvolved White House staff members to support 
NSC 68. Charles Murphy, the President's Special Counsel, and George Elsey, who 
handled many foreign policy matters in the White House, were probably the first 
members of the staff to see the report. In his oral history interview, Murphy recalled 
being so impressed by it that he stayed home for a full day just to study it. The archival 
record supports Murphy's recollection of his conversion experience.58 On 5 April, 
Murphy and Elsey met with the State-Defense group that had written NSC 68. The 
meeting lasted nearly two hours and presumably allowed the group to go over the report 
in some detail. Murphy requested a meeting with the president immediately after Truman 
returned from Key West on 10 April. He recalled telling the president that the paper 
should be referred to the National Security Council and that Leon Keyserling should be 
brought in to participate in the discussion as acting Chairman of the Council of Economic 
Advisers.59  
Why should Truman have changed his views on policy simply because of the new 
balance of opinion in his administration? After all, the president's advisers serve at his 
pleasure and can be replaced if they refuse to accept his decisions.60 Furthermore, Harry 
Truman was perfectly capable of ridding himself of offending advisers, as cabinet 
officers from Henry Wallace to Louis Johnson discovered during his presidency. As 
former Truman White House staff member Richard Neustadt has recognized, however, 
the situation facing the president is more complicated than his legal authority implies.61 
The president needs allies to be re-elected and to insure effective implementation of his 
policies. He cannot ignore the views of important members of his administration, 
particularly when they have the support of critical elements of his electoral coalition. In 
this case, despite his apparent preference for a balanced budget, Truman confronted 
political circumstances in the spring of 1950 in which the approval of NSC 68 had some 
clear advantages over his prior policy of fiscal restraint.  
Rejecting NSC 68 would have created serious political problems. The advocates of 
rearmament had outmaneuvered their opponents in the executive branch. Potential 
opponents were either excluded from the process until it was too late for them to affect 
the outcome or brought into it under circumstances that tended to minimize their 
influence. By the time Louis Johnson signed the report and sent it to the White House, his 
position in the administration was extremely weak, and his allies in the Bureau of the 
Budget and the Council of Economic Advisers were gone. Furthermore, conservative 
White House staff members such as Matthew Connelly and Harry Vaughan, who might 
have sided with Louis Johnson, remained in Key West while the advocates of the new 
policy built support for it in the State and Defense Departments. Charles Murphy's 
backing was secured before the president returned from his vacation in Florida. Because 
of the political acumen of Acheson and Nitze, the president heard few dissenting voices 
on NSC 68. If Truman had rejected NSC 68, he would have been repudiating most of his 
economic and foreign policy advisers, as well as important members of his own staff. 
Truman might have done it anyway, of course, but the cost would have been high.  
Even if those opposed to NSC 68 had been able to mobilize effectively, the president still 
had solid political reasons to prefer the more internationalist position. Truman had not yet 
decided whether he would seek another term as president in 1952. Even if he were not 
planning to run, though, the future of the Democratic party would probably still have 
been important to him. Major internationalists, including Averell Harriman, Robert 
Lovett, and others consulted during the development of NSC 68, already knew about the 
report and supported it. While most of these individuals and the international commercial 
and financial interests they represented had supported the president in 1948, Truman 
must have known that they could still switch their support to a Republican internationalist 
challenger in 1952. These internationally oriented interests were well represented in both 
parties, but were especially important to the Democrats.62 Indeed, Lovett himself was a 
Republican as was at least one other partner of Harriman's and Lovett's at Brown 
Brothers Harriman.63 A refusal to accept NSC 68 might have alienated this important 
element of the elite base of the Democratic party and threatened the coalition that had 
sustained it since the beginning of the New Deal.  
While Truman might have reoriented the Democratic party toward the interests of the less 
internationalist segments of the political economy and rejected NSC 68, this option was 
fraught with political risks. If the president had been considering a third term in 1952, 
this policy choice would have strengthened Louis Johnson as a potential rival. Whatever 
Truman's plans and Johnson's role in them, these conservative interests were not a 
particularly reliable constituency for any Democratic presidential contender in 1952. If 
the Republicans were to nominate Robert Taft, as many expected in 1950, most 
conservatives would probably have supported him regardless of Truman's policy choices. 
Alternatively, as was noted above, if Truman rejected NSC 68 and the Republicans 
nominated an internationalist, an important Democratic constituency might defect. Even 
if Truman had been personally more comfortable with a different political arrangement, 
moving away from the highly successful New Deal formula linking liberal domestic 
policies with an internationalist foreign policy would have been very risky. In the end, 
probably hoping that Leon Keyserling's reassuring views on fiscal policy would prove 
correct, Truman sided with the authors of NSC 68.  
The acceptance of NSC 68 within the administration, and the corresponding rejection of 
the prior plans to maintain a small military budget, were closely tied to changes in the 
composition of the group making policy. Policy changes as important as NSC 68 can 
occur without any clear change in the international environment. International events 
influence policy. However, the meaning of these events for policy depends on the identity 
and interests of the policy makers who interpret them.  
CONCLUSION: THE IMPORTANCE OF DOMESTIC POLITICAL CONFLICT  
This examination of the development of NSC 68 has sought to determine whether a 
state's decision-making apparatus can be treated as a unitary actor under circumstances 
generally considered very favorable to such an approach. Of course, it is obviously true 
that policy is not literally made by a unitary actor. The question here is whether analysts 
can reasonably abstract it as such in order to capture the considerable advantages of such 
a simplification, including concepts like the "national interest" and the treatment of 
external events as if they carried the same policy implications for all domestic actors. The 
case of NSC 68 suggests that the unitary actor assumption produces a very problematic 
account of the policy-making process, even on national security issues.  
Although many accounts of the development of NSC 68 treat the US as a unitary actor 
responding to external events, these accounts face serious difficulties. The events Wells 
and others argue motivated the rearmament program were followed almost immediately 
by a decision to cut the size of the defense budget. By the time North Korean forces 
crossed the 38th parallel on 25 June, the decision to propose to Congress a rearmament 
program based on NSC 68 had already been made. Changes in the group making policy 
between the fall of 1949 and the spring of 1950 offer a better explanation for the decision 
to rearm. Advocates of fiscal restraint such as Frank Pace, Louis Johnson and Edwin 
Nourse, were no longer the dominant group within the administration. They were 
replaced by others more concerned with building a formidable military force in Europe 
and covering the dollar gap than with balancing the federal budget. This case suggests 
some tentative conclusion about the relationship between domestic political conflict, 
international conditions and policy change.  
While events and conditions in the international system influence policy, there is no 
necessary connection between international conditions and foreign policy change. The 
linkage between the international system and policy is mediated by the divergent goals 
and priorities of different members of the group making policy. The international 
environment may influence policy by changing these actors' interests or beliefs or by 
altering their calculation of how best to achieve their goals. On the other hand, policy 
makers may simply understand events in a way that coincides with their prior interests 
and beliefs. Events do not interpret themselves, and it is unlikely that any particular one 
will have a single meaning for all concerned. In extreme circumstances, even something 
as catastrophic as a direct attack by a foreign army may be viewed as liberation by some 
and as an invasion by others. For those interested in the policy response to such an event, 
the question of who is in charge is at least as important as the question of what happened.  
Even if there is consensus on goals, disagreement over relative policy priorities may be 
just as important. In 1949 and 1950, there was virtually no disagreement within the 
Truman administration about the goals of containing Soviet power and facilitating 
economic recovery in Western Europe. However, it was not possible to have rearmament 
on the scale imagined by the advocates of NSC 68 and fiscal restraint of the sort desired 
by its opponents. In this case, the trade-offs imposed by the cost of the new policy linked 
it to such substantively unrelated areas as fiscal policy. The dynamics of the process were 
shaped by actors' preferences on these other issues, as well as on national security policy 
itself.  
Different perceptions of the meaning of events and the appropriate policy response are 
especially likely to be significant in cases of policy change. The decision to adopt a new 
policy will inevitably affect the priorities and interests of important political actors in 
different ways. Because it may disrupt the existing distribution of resources and political 
rewards both inside and outside the government, policy innovation may expose 
previously submerged conflicts among those affected by it. For a policy to be 
implemented, the conflicts among these actors must be resolved. In order for NSC 68 to 
become administration policy, those within the executive branch opposed to enlarging the 
military and foreign aid budgets first had to be either induced to reverse their position or 
removed from positions where they could interfere with the new policy. In this case, and 
probably in others as well, these changes in the policy-making group were not linked to 
international events.  
An analysis of the foreign policy-making process should center on the beliefs and 
interests of the group controlling policy and its challengers, and the process by which 
conflict between them is resolved. An arrangement may evolve reconciling the 
contending interests, or one group may gain the upper hand and exclude the other from 
further influence over policy. International events may prompt policy change by changing 
the identity or interests of those who make policy. On the other hand, there need not be 
any change in the international system for policy change to occur. Even on national 
security issues, these dynamics may complicate the relationship between international 
conditions and policy outcomes in ways that make unitary actor models and associated 
concepts such as "the national interest" or "core values" inappropriate tools for 
understanding the policy-making process.  
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